Verses 1-7. - How long the paradisiacal state of innocence and felicity continued the historian does not declare, probably as not falling within the scope of his immediate design. Psalm 49:12 has been thought, though without sufficient reason, to hint that man's Eden life was of comparatively short duration. The present chapter relates the tragic incident which brought it to a termination. Into the question of the origin of moral evil in the universe it does not enter. The metaphysical problem of how the first thought of sin could arise in innocent beings it does not attempt to resolve. It seeks to explain the genesis of evil with reference to man. Nor even with regard to this does it aim at an exhaustive dissertation, but only at such a statement of its beginnings as shall demonstrate that God is not the author of sin, but that man, by his own free volition, brought his pristine state of purity and happiness to an end. A due regard to this, the specific object of the Mosaic narrative, will go far to answer not a few of the objections which have been taken to its historic credibility. Like the Mosaic record of creation, the Biblical story of the fall has been impugned on a variety of grounds.

1. The doctrine of a fall, which this chapter clearly teaches, has been assailed as inconsistent with the dictates of a speculative philosophy, if not also with the tenets of a Scriptural theology. While in the present narrative the origin of sin is distinctly traced back to the free volition of man acting without constraint, though not without temptation, in opposition to the Divine will, a more exact psychological analysis, it is alleged, declares it to have been from the first a necessity, either

(1) metaphysically, as being involved in the very conception of a finite will (Spinoza, Leibnitz, Baur); or

(2) historically, "as the expression of the necessary transition of the human race from the state of nature to that of culture" (Fichte, Kant, Schiller), or as developing itself in obedience to the law of antagonism and conflict (John Seotus Erigena, Hegel, Sehleiermacher, Schelling); or

(3) theologically, as predetermined by a Divine decree (supralapsarianism). Without offering any separate refutation of these anti-Scriptural theories, it may suffice to say that in all questions affecting man's responsibility, the testimony of the individual consciousness, the ultimate ground of appeal, apart from revelation, affirms moral evil to be no all-controlling necessity, but the free product of the will of the creature.

2. The narrative of the fall has been impugned -

(1) On the ground of its miraculous character. But unless we are prepared to equate the supernatural with the impossible and incredible, we must decline to admit the force of such objections.

(2) On the ground of its mythical form, resembling as it does, in some slight degree, Oriental traditions, and in particular the Persian legend of Ormuzd and Ahriman (vide infra, 'Traditions of the Fall'). But here the same remark will apply as was made in connection with the similarity alleged to exist between the Mosaic and heathen cosmogonies: it is immeasurably easier and more natural to account for the resemblance of Oriental legend to Biblical history, by supposing the former to be a traditional reflection of the latter, than it is to explain the unchallengable superiority of the latter to the former, even in a literary point of view, not to mention ethical aspects at all, by tracing both to a common source - the philosophic or theologic consciousness of man.

(3) There are also those who, while neither repudiating it on the ground of miracle, nor discrediting it as a heathen myth, yet decline to accept it as other than a parabolic or allegorical narration of what transpired in the spiritual experience of the first pair. History is often a parable of truth. Verse 1. - Now (literally, and) the serpent. Nachash, from nachash -

(1) in Kal, to hiss (unused), with allusion to the hissing sound emitted by the reptile (Gesenius, Furst), though it has been objected that prior to the fall the serpent could hardly have been called by a name derived from its present constitution (Delitzsch);

(2) in Piel, to whisper, use sorcery, find out by divination (Genesis 30:27), suggestive of the creature's wisdom (Bush), Which, however, is regarded as doubtful (Furst);

(3) to shine (unused, though supplying the noun nechsheth, brass, Genesis 4:22), referring to its glossy shining appearance, and in par-titular its bright glistening eye: cf. δράκων from δέρκομαι, and ὅφις from ὄπτομαι (T. Lewis);

(4) from an Arabic root signifying to pierce, to move, to creep, so that nachash would be Latin serpens (Furst). The presence of the article before nachash has been thought to mean a certain serpent, but "by eminent authorities this is pronounced to be unwarranted" (Macdonald). Was more subtle. 'Arum -

(1) Crafty (cf. Job 5:12; Job 15:5);

(2) prudent, in a good sense (cf. Proverbs 12:16), from 'aram -

(a) To make naked; whence atom, plural arumim, naked (Genesis 2:25).

(b) To crafty (1 Samuel 23:22). If applied to the serpent in the sense of πανοῦργος (Aquila, Keil, Lange, Macdonald),

it can only be either

(1) metaphorically for the devil, whose instrument it was; or

(2) proleptically, with reference to the results of the temptation; for in itself, as one of God's creatures, it must have been originally good. It seems more correct to regard the epithet as equivalent to φρόνιμος (LXX.), and to hold that Moses, in referring to the subtlety of this creature, "does not so much point out a fault as attribute praise to nature" (Calvin), and describes qualities which in themselves were good, such as quickness of sight, swiftness of motion, activity of the self-preserving instinct, seemingly intelligent adaptation -of means to end, with perhaps a glance, in the use of 'arum, at the sleekness of its glossy skin; but which were capable of being perverted to an unnatural use by the power and craft of a superior intelligence (cf. Matthew 10:16: γίνεσθε οϋν φρόνιμοι ω). Than any (literally, was subtil more than any) beast of the field which the Lord God had made. The comparison here instituted is commonly regarded as a proof that the tempter was a literal serpent, though Macdonald finds in the contrast between it and all other creatures, as well as in the ascription to it of pre-eminent subtlety, which is not now a characteristic of serpents, an intimation that the reptile was no creature of earth, or one that received its form from God," an opinion scarcely different from that of Cyril (100. Julian., lib. 3), that it was only the simulacrum of a serpent. But

(1) the curse pronounced upon the serpent (Genesis 3:14) would seem to be deprived of all force if the subject of it had been only an apparition or an unreal creature; and

(2) the language of the New Testament in referring to man's temptation implies its literality (cf. 2 Corinthians 11:3). "We are perfectly justified in concluding, from this mention of the fall, that Paul spoke of it as an actual occurrence" (Olshausen). Adam Clarke contends with much enthusiasm that the tempter was not a serpent, but an ape or orangutan. And he said. Not as originally endowed with speech (Josephus, Clarke), or gifted at this particular time with the power of articulation ('Ephrem., lib. de paradiso,' c. 27, quoted by Willet), but simply as used by the devil (Augustine, Calvin, Rosenmüller, et alii), who from this circumstance is commonly styled in Scripture 'The serpent," "the old serpent," "that old serpent" (cf. Revelation 12:9; Revelation 20:2). Nor is it more difficult to understand the speaking of the serpent when possessed by Satan, than the talking of Balaam s ass when the Lord opened its mouth (Numbers 22:28-30). Equally with the idea that the devil was the only agent in man s temptation, and that the serpent is purely the allegorical dress in which the historian clothes him (Eusebius, Cajetan, Quarry, Alford), must the notion be rejected that there was nothing but a serpent (Aben Ezra, Kalisch, Knobel). Why, if there was an evil spirit manipulating the reptile, the historian did not say so has been explained

(1) on the ground that the belief in the devil was then foreign to the Hebrews (Knobel);

(2) that up to this point in the narrative there is no mention of the devil (White of Dorchester);

(3) that Moses simply wished to be rei gestae scriptor non interpres (Pererins);

(4) that it was unnecessary, those for whom he wrote being sufficiently capable of discerning that the serpent was not the prime mover in the transaction (Candlish);

(5) that "by a homely and uncultivated style he accommodates what he delivers to the capacity of the people" (Calvin);

(6) that his object being merely to show that God had no hand in man's temptation, but that Adam sinned of himself, it was not needful to do more than recite the incident as it appeared to the senses (White);

(7) that he wished "to avoid encouraging the disposition to transfer the blame to the evil spirit which tempted man, and thus reduce sin to a mere act of weakness" (Keil). Unto the woman. As the weaker of the two, and more likely to be easily persuaded (1 Timothy 2:14; 1 Peter 3:7). Cf. Satan's assault on Job through his wife (Job 2:9). Milton's idea that Eve desired to be independent, and had withdrawn herself out of Adam's sight, it has been well remarked, "sets up a beginning of the fall before the fall itself" (Lunge). Yea. אַפ כּי. Is it even so that? (Gesenius). Is it really so that! (Ewald, Furst, Keil). Etiamne, vel Itane (Calvin). A question either

(1) spoken in irony, as if the meaning were, "Very like it is that. God careth what you eat!" or

(2) inquiring the reason of the prohibition (LXX., - τί ὅτι εϊπενὁ θεὸς; Vulgate, cur praecepit vobis Deus); or

(3) simply soliciting information (Chaldee Paraphrase); but

(4) most likely expressing surprise and astonishment, with the view of suggesting distrust of the Divine goodness and disbelief in the Divine veracity (Ewald, Rosenmüller, Kalisch, Keil, Macdonald, Lunge). The conversation may have been commenced by the tempter, and the question "thrown out as a feeler for some weak point where the fidelity of the woman might be shaken" (Murphy); but it is more likely that the devil spoke in continuation of a colloquy which is not reported (Kalisch, Macdonald), which has led some, on the supposition that already many arguments had been adduced to substantiate the Divine severity, to render "yea" by "quanto magis," as if the meaning were, "How much more is this a proof of God's unkindness!" (Aben Ezra, Kimchi). Hath God said. "The tempter felt it necessary to change the living personal God into a merely general numen divinum" (Keil); but the Elohim of Genesis 1. He was not a mere numen divinum As much astray is the observation that Satan wished to avoid profaning the name of Jehovah (Knobel). Better is the remark that the serpent could not utter the name Jehovah as his assault was directed against the paradisiacal covenant of God with man (Lange). By using the name Elohim instead of Jehovah the covenant relationship of God towards man was obscured, and man's position in the garden represented as that of a subject rather than a son. As it were, Eve was first placed at the furthest distance possible from the supreme, and then assailed. Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden. I.e. either accepting the present rendering as correct, which the Hebrew will bear, - "Are there any trees in the garden of which you may not eat?" "Is it really so that God hath prohibited you from some?" (Calvin), - or, translating lo-kol as not any - Latin, nullus (Gesenius, § 152, 1) - "Hath God said ye shall not eat of any?" (Macdonald, Keil). According to the first the devil simply seeks to impeach the Divine goodness; according to the second he also aims at intensifying the Divine prohibition. The second rendering appears to be supported by the fitness of Eve's reply.