(20) For, though there were parts of God's being into which the eye could not penetrate, still they were easily to be inferred from the character of His visible creation, which bore throughout the stamp of Omnipotence and Divinity.

The invisible things of him.--His invisible attributes, afterwards explained as "His eternal power and Godhead."

Are clearly seen . . . by the things that are made.--There is something of a play upon words here. "The unseen is seen--discerned by the eye of the mind--being inferred or perceived by the help of that which is made," i.e., as we should say, by the phenomena of external nature.

Even His eternal power and Godhead.--A summary expression for those attributes which, apart from revelation, were embodied in the idea of God. Of these "power" is the most obvious. St. Paul does not go into the questions that have been raised in recent times as to the other qualities which are to be inferred as existing in the Author of nature; but he sums them up under a name that might be used as well by a Pagan philosopher as by a Christian--the attributes included in the one term "Godhead." Divinity would be, perhaps, a more correct translation of the expression. What is meant is "divine nature," rather than "divine personality."

So that they are without excuse.--They could not plead ignorance.

Verse 20. - For the invisible things of him from (i.e. since, ἀπὸ) the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Divinity (θειότης, not θεότης); so that they are without excuse. The concluding clause is rendered in the Revised Version, "that they may be without excuse;" and it is true that εἰς τὸ αῖναι αὐτοὺς does not express the fact that they now are so, but the subjective result of the manifestation, if disregarded. "Paulus directe excusationem adimit, non solum de eventu aliquo loquitur" (Bengel). It is, however, a question of importance, which has been much discussed, whether (as the rendering of the Revised Version might be taken to imply) the idea of Divine purpose, and [not result only, is involved in εἰς τὸ εῖναι. The difference between the two conceptions is apparent from the Vulgate, ira at sint inexcusabiles, compared with Calvin's in hoc ut. The bearing of the distinction on the doctrine of predestination is obvious, and it was consequently a subject of contention between the Lutherans and Calvinists. Meyer among moderns contends strongly that "the view which takes it of the purpose is required by the prevailing use of εἰς with the infinitive," referring in this Epistle to Romans 1:11; Romans 3:26; Romans 4:11, 16, 18; Romans 6:12; Romans 7:4, 5; Romans 8:29; Romans 11:11; Romans 12:2, 3; Romans 15:8, 13, 16. A comparison, however, of these passages does not seem to bear out his contention, it being apparently dependent on the context in each case, rather than the phrase εἰς τὸ, whether the idea of purpose comes in. Chrysostom among the ancients expressly opposed this view, saying, Καίτοιγε οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα ἐποίησεν,ὁ Θεὸς, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ἐξέβη. Οὐ γὰρ ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἀπολογίας ἀποστερήση διδασκαλίαν τοσαύτην εἰς μέσον προὔθηκεν ἀλλ ἵνα αὐτὸν ἐπιγνῶσιν. So that they should be may be suggested as an adequate rendering, so as to avoid the idea of God's manifestation of himself to men hating been from the first delusive, having condemnation, and not enlightenment, for its purpose. These two verses, 19 and 20, carry out the thought of τὴμ ἀλήθειαν κατεχόντων in ver. 18, their purport being to show that the ἀσέβεια and ἀδικία of men have been in spite of knowledge, and therefore involve them all in sin. For sin implies knowledge of good and evil; it is not imputed to the brute beasts, who but follow their natural instincts, having no perception of God or a Divine law. Now, to man, even without any special revelation, God manifests himself in two ways - outwardly in nature, and inwardly in conscience. In these verses the outward manifestation is spoken of, the other being more especially noted in ch. 2:14, etc. But here, too, an inward manifestation is implied by the word νοούμενα, as before by ἐν αὐτοῖς. To the animals below us the phenomena of nature may be but a spectacle before their eyes, making no appeal to a mind within. But to man they have a language - they awake wonder, awe, admiration, a sense of infinite mysterious power, and, to the receptive of such impressions, of ideal beauty indefinable. To the psalmists of old they spoke irresistibly of God; of one infinite and eternal Being, above and beyond all; and their consciences, owning the supremacy of good in the moral sphere, concurred with their sense of the evidences of beneficence in nature, so as to convince them also of the righteousness of God. All men (the apostle would say) were originally endowed with a like capacity of knowing God; and their failure in this regard, shown in the various forms of idolatry prevalent throughout the world, he views as the first stage in the development of human sin. The next stage is general moral degradation, regarded as the judicial consequence of the dishonour done to God. It is, indeed, a necessary consequence; for low and unworthy conceptions of Deity bring with them moral deterioration; when man's Divine ideal becomes degraded, with it he becomes degraded too. Witness, for instance, the debauches and cruelties that so commonly accompanied idolatrous worship. Lastly, the final stage of this moral degradation is represented in an unveiled picture of the utter wickedness, and even unnatural vice, at that time prevalent and condoned in the heart of the boasted civilization of the heathen world. Such is the drift of the remainder of this first chapter. The argument suggests the following thoughts.

(1) There is no mention here of Adam s transgression as the origin of human sin. The reason is that the apostle is arguing from a philosophical rather than a theological point of view, having Gentile as well as Jewish thinkers in his view as readers. His appeal in this chapter is not to the Old Testament at all, but to facts by all acknowledged. He is offering the world a philosophy of human history to account for the present perplexing state of things - for the undoubted discord between conscience and performance, between ideal and practice, - his purpose being to show universal guilt on the part of man. But his position here is quite consistent with what he says elsewhere (as in ch. 5.) of Adam's original transgression. For his whole argument in this chapter involves the doctrine of the fall of man, who is conceived to have been originally endowed with Divine instincts, and to have forfeited his prerogative through sin; and this is the essential meaning of the picture given us in Genesis 3. of the original transgression.

(2) The entire drift of the chapter is against the view of the condemnation of mankind being due simply to the sin of the progenitor being imputed to the race. For all men are represented as guilty, in that all have sinned against light which they might have followed. This view does not, indeed, preclude that of an inherited infection of nature predisposing all to sin; nay, it rather necessitates it; for why should the sin have been so universal but for such predisposing cause? Still, the distinction between the two views is important in regard to our conception of the Divine justice. 3. It may, however, be said that the distinction is without a real difference in this regard; for that, if the inherited infection is such that sin becomes inevitable (as seems to be implied by its alleged universality), it may appear as inconsistent with the Divine justice to condemn men for it, as it would be to impute to them their progenitor's transgression. In reply to this difficulty, it may be said that Scripture nowhere says that men are finally condemned for it. On the contrary, the gospel reveals to us the atonement, preordained from the first, for the avoidance of such final condemnation; and this retrospective as well as prospective in its effects (Romans 3:25, 26), and as far-reaching as was the original transgression (Romans 4:12, etc.). And our apostle (Romans 2:7, 14, 15, 16) expressly asserts the salvation of all who, according to their light, have done what they could. The fact is, that in the argument before us (as in other passages of similar purport) it is only the principle, or the ground, of man's possible justification before God that is under review. The intention is to show that this cannot be man's own "works or deservings," as of debt, but is another which the gospel reveals. Be it observed, lastly, that a clear view of this position is important, not only for our apprehension of the truth of things and of the meaning of the gospel, but also for our right moral tone of mind and attitude before God. For not to be convinced of sin is to belie the true ideal of our conscience, and implies acquiescence in a moral standard below that of the Divine righteousness to which we are able to aspire.

1:18-25 The apostle begins to show that all mankind need the salvation of the gospel, because none could obtain the favour of God, or escape his wrath by their own works. For no man can plead that he has fulfilled all his obligations to God and to his neighbour; nor can any truly say that he has fully acted up to the light afforded him. The sinfulness of man is described as ungodliness against the laws of the first table, and unrighteousness against those of the second. The cause of that sinfulness is holding the truth in unrighteousness. All, more or less, do what they know to be wrong, and omit what they know to be right, so that the plea of ignorance cannot be allowed from any. Our Creator's invisible power and Godhead are so clearly shown in the works he has made, that even idolaters and wicked Gentiles are left without excuse. They foolishly followed idolatry; and rational creatures changed the worship of the glorious Creator, for that of brutes, reptiles, and senseless images. They wandered from God, till all traces of true religion must have been lost, had not the revelation of the gospel prevented it. For whatever may be pretended, as to the sufficiency of man's reason to discover Divine truth and moral obligation, or to govern the practice aright, facts cannot be denied. And these plainly show that men have dishonoured God by the most absurd idolatries and superstitions; and have degraded themselves by the vilest affections and most abominable deeds.For the invisible things of him,.... Not the angels, the invisible inhabitants of heaven: nor the unseen glories of another world; nor the decrees of God; nor the persons in the Godhead; but the perfections of God, or his "properties", as the Arabic version reads it; and which are explained by "his eternal power and Godhead": these,

from the creation of the world are clearly seen; this is no new discovery, but what men have had, and might, by the light of nature, have enjoyed ever since the world was created; these

being understood, in an intellectual way, by the discursive faculty of the understanding,

by the things that are made; the various works of creation; all which proclaim the being, unity, and perfections of God their Creator,

so that they are without excuse; the very Heathens, who have only the light of nature, and are destitute of a revelation, have no colour or pretext for their idolatrous practices, and vicious lives; nor have they, nor will they have anything to object to God's righteous judgment against them, or why they should not be condemned.